Sobh-e-No, in a commentary, discussed the support by the Egyptian people for the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the paper, Egyptians instinctively hate Israel and support anyone who opposes it. The association between ‘resistance’ and opposition to Israel has pushed most Egyptians toward supporting Hezbollah and Hamas.

Egyptians were astonished by Hezbollah’s courage and patriotism in liberating southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation in 2000. For this reason, Israel and the United States viewed Hezbollah as Iran’s powerful arm in the region—especially against Israel—and sought to weaken it. Hezbollah, acting in solidarity with the Palestinian movement, used its rockets to pressure Israel, something Egyptians widely approved of and supported. Egyptians came to believe that Israel’s attacks on Iran were aimed at silencing and suppressing a state that supports the resistance. Moreover, Israel’s conduct in Gaza—and Egypt’s inability to save Gaza—has exposed the brutality of Israel, making Egyptians feel that this brutality could one day threaten their own country. As a result, many Egyptians now hope for Iran’s victory over Israel.

Hamshahri: Iran’s nuclear program and return to negotiations

This newspaper wrote about the resumption of negotiations between Iran and the United States: Iran and the U.S., after an eight?month pause, have restarted nuclear talks, discussions that followed the aftermath of the 2025 military strikes and amid rising tensions. A review of the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program shows how the issue evolved from early cooperation into one of the world’s most complex political disputes. During Trump’s second presidential term, Washington agreed to resume talks with Tehran. The initial negotiations in the first year of Trump’s second administration produced no concrete proposals. Then, in June 2025, the United States bombed Iran’s main nuclear facilities. But now, in 2026, the two countries have returned to the negotiating table. Many nuclear experts say Iran will strongly oppose the complete dismantling of its nuclear facilities—especially because the nuclear program remains one of its last political leverage points. Achieving a more balanced compromise between the U.S. and Iran will largely depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to offer some form of economic relief to Iran.

Arman-e-Emrooz: Both sides must show flexibility in negotiations

Arman-e-Emrooz, in an analysis, addressed recent remarks by Foreign Minister Araghchi. The paper argues that in his latest clarification regarding Iran–U.S. negotiations, the foreign minister effectively outlined a general roadmap based on two main pillars: the steps Iran can take, and the reciprocal actions expected from Western parties—especially the United States and the European Union. This approach reflects both Iran’s diplomatic flexibility and its unwillingness to take unilateral steps without receiving tangible and verifiable concessions. However, the window for reaching an understanding—even a limited and phased one—is closing, and both sides must show flexibility as soon as possible. In the current situation, the flexibility expected from Iran does not necessarily mean unilateral retreat; rather, it signals readiness to enter a serious, realistic, and results?oriented dialogue. Iran has shown that, in view of its red lines, it can adopt initiatives that build trust. But this readiness depends on the other side demonstrating that it seeks a genuine agreement, not merely maximum pressure and time?wasting.

Farhikhtegan: Purpose behind Vance’s visit to South Caucasus

Farhikhtegan, in a commentary, examined J.D. Vance’s trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It wrote that this visit comes at a moment when Iran–U.S. relations are at one of their most sensitive stages. Although diplomatic channels have not been completely shut, the possibility of escalating confrontation—especially in the form of limited clashes or proxy warfare—is being seriously discussed. In such an atmosphere, the United States’ active presence in the South Caucasus carries a clear message for Tehran: pressure will not be applied solely through sanctions or the Persian Gulf; Iran’s surrounding environment is also becoming a scene of competition. Through this presence, Washington seeks both to manage instability in the southern Caucasus and to signal that, if the crisis expands, it is prepared to use its geopolitical tools in Iran’s northern neighborhood. For Iran, these developments are consequential. A combination of political, economic, and security pressures in the northern region could constrain strategic decision?making and reduce room for maneuver. Any delay in responding to this trend would mean gradually ceding the field to actors whose goal is to shift the regional balance to Tehran’s disadvantage.